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THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE: A CONSERVATIVE VIEW
"There is no magic in the writing itself."
Wigmore*
This is an attempt to describe the parol evidence rule; to show that it is
only because there is magic in the writing that the rule exists; and to show that
the rule is a restatement of the objective theory of contract interpretation.
Since the cases in Illinois represent as well as any the operation of the rule, they
have been selected as the basis for this inquiry.
I
Every exclusion of evidence resulting from the application of the parol evi-
dence rule presupposes at least that the writing is binding upon the parties.,
An instrument cannot be legally operative until it has been delivered2 and de-
livery depends not upon the transfer of possession but upon the intent of the
parties.3 Since it is not ordinarily possible to determine whether the parties in-
tended to deliver the document by an examination of the writing, it is necessary
that delivery be established by parol. But this is not an exception to the parol
evidence rule. The issues are not the same. The delivery issue is whether an in-
strument is to have legal significance. The issue for the parol evidence rule is the
amount of significance to be given to the writing.
It is also erroneous to conclude that the delivery question is not related to the
parol evidence rule. The relationship results from a distinction used to deter-
mine whether an oral agreement, prescribing a condition to be fulfilled before
the parties are to be bound and made at the time the instrument is manually
delivered, ought to be considered. The distinction is that a condition to be per-
formed before the instrument is considered delivered may be shown, but a condi-
tion to be performed before the agreement is binding and after delivery may
not be shown.4 While this distinction is merely a restatement of the difference
between the subject matter of the delivery doctrine and the parol evidence rule,
* 9 Evidence § 2400 (3d ed., I94o) at 5.
x Fisk Tire Co. v. Burmeister, 252 fl1. App. 545 (1929).
2 Ryan v. Cooke, 172 Ill. 302, 5o N.E. 213 (i898); Jordan v. Davis, io8 In. 336 (1884). For
a discussion of the development of this doctrine see 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2405 (3d ed., 1940).
3 Jordan v. Davis, io8 Ill. 336 (1884).
4 Ibid.; Ryan v. Cooke, 172 fI1. 302, 5o N.E. 213 (i898); Stanley v. White, i6o Ill. 6o5,
43 N.E. 729 (i896); 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2410 (3d ed., 194o) at 35. For negotiable instru-
ments, the distinction has been made in terms of a conditional delivery as opposed to a con-
ditional payment. Larson v. Lybyer, 312 Ill. App. i88, 38 N.E. 2d 177 (1941); State Bank of
West Pullman v. Hovnanian, 250 Ill. App. 144 (1928); Handley v. Drum, 237 Ill. App. 587
(1925)-
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and although it is theoretically accurate, it has been difficult to apply. Inas-
much as the inquiry for the courts is directed toward the intent of the parties,
and the parties intend in both situations not to be bound by the terms of the
instrument until a condition is performed, the imposition of a determining fac-
tor (the intent to pass present title to the writing)S not considered by the parties
can only lead to conflicting results.
Not every case in which the delivery problem is at issue involves a condition.
It is not difficult to decide, for example, that a contract given to another for
display is not to be considered as delivered.' For purpose of analysis, cases
involving a condition appear to fall into two groups. One is composed of
instruments which are printed forms. The other is composed of instruments
which have been prepared by the parties. The courts have found little trouble in
permitting a party to show that a term in a printed form was to be altered be-
fore he was to be bound.7 It is the situation in which the instrument is not a
printed form and conceded to be the ultimate obligation of the parties but was
not to become binding until the performance of an extrinsic condition that has
presented the problem.
The condition has taken two principal forms. One is the necessity of approval
by a third party, and it is the subject matter of C-urtis v. Harrison' and Ryan v.
McArdle.9 The other is the necessity of a contract between one of the parties
and a third person, and it is the subject matter of Jordan v. Daviseo and Ryan v.
Cooke.-
s While this is not the familiar way to describe the factor, several Illinois decisions contain
this language. See, e.g., Stanley v. White, 16o Ill. 605, 43 N.E. 729 (x896).
6 See Khosrovschahi v. Goldberg, 333 Ill. App. 378, 77 N.E. 2d 569 (948).
7A form providing for the guarantee of an unlimited amount of credit was to be limited to a
maximum of four hundred dollars. Fisk Tire Co. v. Burmeister, 252 Ill. App. 545 (r929). A
form providing for the delivery of the purchased goods "within four months" was to be changed
to "as needed." The court reluctantly permitted the agreement to be shown, declaring that
"in doing so, we are of the opinion that there is not much left of the parol evidence rule. . .
Northwestern Consolidated Milling Co. v. Sloan, 232 Ill. App. 266, 271 (1924).
8 36 Ill. App. 287 (x889). The defendant signed a contract for the erection of a monument
and subsequently notified the plaintiff-seller not to perform. The defendant offered to prove
that the delivery of the contract was conditional upon the approval of her children.
9 159 Ill. App. 579 (39x). The defendant lessee, having signed a lease, offered to show as a
defense to his breach an agreement that the lease was to be approved by a third person before
the lessee was to be bound and that this assent was never given.
" xo8 I. 336 (x884). The plaintiff, claiming to be the sole lessee, brought an action of forci-
ble detainer against the defendant who occupied the premises and who also claimed to be the
sole lessee. The court found that the lease under which the defendant claimed was drawn with
the understanding that the defendant was to procure the endorsement of a third person as
guarantor for the rent before the lease was to be binding; that the defendant notified the owner
concerning the impossibility of procuring the signature; and that the owner then leased to
the plaintiff.
1 172 Il. 302, 5o N.E. 213 (x898). Under a patent-licensing agreement, the defendant li-
censee refused to manufacture the required minimum number of items upon which he was to
pay a royalty. The licensee offered to show an oral agreement that he was not to be bound until
he procured a contract from the city of Chicago which he failed to do.
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In the Curtis case the defendant contended that the delivery of the contract
was not to take effect until the contract had been approved by specified persons
and that it was agreed that the plaintiff would take the contract to them but had
not done so. Proof of this contention was admissible. In the MoArdle case, the
court quoted the defendant as offering to prove "[tihat at the time of the signing
of this contract [it was agreed] that this contract should not become effective
until it was approved by [a third person], and that assent was never given, and
therefore the contract was never delivered."- This offer of proof was rejected.
Despite the fact that both defendants sought to achieve the same end, that is,
to keep the contract inoperative until the performance of the same condition,
the language utilized by counsel was so important to the court that it failed to
determine adequately the only basis it had for resolving the delivery issue-the
intention of the parties. The difference between contending that the delivery
was conditional and that the obligation was conditional was all that was re-
quired to produce contrary results from the same facts.
In the Jordan case, a completed lease was signed and left with the lessee
under an agreement that it should not become binding until the lessee found a
guarantor to sign the lease. The plaintiff's counsel asked that the jury be in-
structed "that the [lease] was not to become a binding contract between the
parties until the same was so guarantied .... ,,43 The evidence of the agreement
was admissible. In the Cooke case, it was understood that a contract was not to
become binding until the defendants obtained a contract from a municipality.
The evidence of the agreement was not admissible.14 It cannot be said that
there is a difference in the language of the contentions here.
The Jordan case and the Curtis case are examples of agreements to keep the
contract inoperative until the performance of a condition. The agreements have
been admitted because the courts found a condition to be performed precedent
- Ryan v. McArdle, 159 Ill. App. 579, 583 (191i).
x3 Jordan v. Davis, io8 Ill. 336, 340 (1884). The defendant asked for the following instruc-
tion: "That if the jury believe.., that the lease ... was executed by [the parties], and un-
conditionally delivered... then such lease was not made... upon condition that [the lessee]
would procure [the third party] to guaranty the payment of the lease; that no such condition
is found in the lease, and no verbal agreement to give such guaranty, if made prior to the
execution of the lease, would be of any effect as against the terms of the lease." Ibid., at 341-
The court believed that" [tihis instruction, as applied to the facts in the case, was false and mis-
leading.... This instruction carried the wrongful idea to the jury that the condition.., to
be of avail, should have been embodied in the lease .... The verbal agreement for the lease
was not offered in contradiction of the terms of the lease, but to disprove delivery. The ques-
tion of delivery is something aside from the writing in an instrument." Ibid., at 342.
14 The defendants had in fact pleaded that the verbal agreement was made after the delivery
of the contract but on the same day. Neither the parol evidence rule nor the delivery doctrine
is applicable to agreements made subsequent to delivery, and the entire discussion of the case
by the court would be meaningless unless the agreement is considered to be contemporaneous
with the execution of the document. For other examples of the temporal scope of "contempo-
raneous" see cases cited note 35 infra. Without any analysis of the intention of the parties,
the court simply declared that the "delivery of the contract... is established beyond ques-
tion, and there is no evidence of a conditional delivery of the same." Ryan v. Cooke, 172 Ill.
302,309, 5o N.E. 213, 215 (1898).
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to delivery. The McArdle and Cooke cases are also examples of agreements to
keep the contract inoperative until the performance of a condition. But these
agreements have been rejected because they show a condition to be performed
subsequent to delivery. Yet there is no difference in the "non-legal" intent of
the parties or in the conditions. And while it can be said that there is at times a
difference in the language used by the parties to describe the function of these
conditions, the difference does not always exist, so that it cannot be the dis-
tinguishing feature and is of no help in deciding these cases. Since the theo-
retical distinction between the subject matter of the parol evidence rule and the
delivery doctrine is sound, it is not readily apparent why these cases should
cause so much difficulty.15
When a sound distinction is applied and the resulting decisions are in conflict,
it would seem to indicate that the facts which are important to the court can be
as easily described by one concept as the other. But any distinction implies
that there is at least one fact which is necessarily present in one concept and
not in the other. The fact which distinguishes the subject matter of the parol
evidence rule from that of the delivery doctrine is the "intent" of the parties to
pass a present title to the instrument. This fact, which the courts admit to be
the object of their inquiry, cannot be adequately determined because the parties
do not frame their intention in those terms. It is likely that the confusion will
continue.
The persistence of the confusion is a confession that the maintenance of the
distinction is more important than the results of its application. The importance
of searching for an illusory and generally nonexistent fact must be explained
by the importance of the basis of the distinction. The basis can be discovered
by restating the distinction in terms of the obligation of the parties. In those
terms, the difference is between an intention not to be bound by the writing, as
opposed to an intention to be bound by the writing but not by the obligation.
To make sense of this restatement it is necessary to believe that the writing has
significance apart from the actual obligation of the parties. Since the intent with
respect to the writing, rather than the intent with respect to the obligation,
is decisive for the admissibility of parol agreements, it is now clear that not only
has the writing a significance of its own but delivery makes the writing more
important than the actual obligation. So the conclusion must be that it is the
magic of the writing which forms the basis of the distinction, makes the search
for illusory and often nonexistent facts important, and is responsible for the
persistent confusion. 6
The most conclusive test of the magic of the writing is the situation in which
an oral agreement that would clearly show a conditional delivery competes
with a writing that denies the existence of the condition. The test is conclusive
because no writing can do more than predict an intention of the parties which
IS Nor is it apparent why it should make a difference that an instrument is in printed form.
x6 With respect to printed forms, all that can be said at this point is that their significance
apart from the actual obligation is not as magical as that of writings drafted by the parties.
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will exist after the document has been drawn, and delivery must necessarily fol-
low the execution of the writing. Yet the oral agreement cannot be shown.
The defendant and forty-four others in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Cohen 7
had signed a written guarantee for the payment of bonds issued by a borrower
to a lender to secure a loan. The maker defaulted. The defendant offered to
show that the contract of guarantee was delivered upon the condition that it
was not to be binding until executed by additional parties. It was conceded
that the defense, if accepted, would show a conditional delivery. Yet the offer
was rejected because the court found the writing to be inconsistent with the
contention. While there was no provision in the contract which conflicted with
the condition, the inconsistency was inferred from the fact that all forty-five
individuals named as parties of the first part in the contract had signed the
document. '
Since ordinary notions about delivery would have decided the Title & Trust
case in a contrary manner, the court has conclusively confirmed the existence
of the magic by considering it the determining factor in the situation where the
magic is least likely to exist.
The delivery doctrine has served as the initial step because it has reflected the
fundamental concept of the parol evidence rule. The concept is the magic of
writing..
II
The significance of writing is the principal notion of the parol evidence rule.
The legal concept reflects the purpose of an everyday commercial practice. The
practice is to reduce oral agreements to writing. If the parties were confident that
the oral agreement would be performed, there would be no need to reduce it to
writing. So the anticipation of a possible breach and future litigation is re-
sponsible for the practice.
The function of writing in litigation is to provide a basis for determining the
obligation of the parties.19 Since the obligation could have been determined
by oral testimony,2° the decision to reduce the oral agreement to writing means
17 284 Ill. App. 18I, i N.E. 2d 717 (1936).
18 The plaintiff contended and apparently the court agreed that while "conditional deliver
may be shown outside the language of the contract... [if] the contract on its face denies the
existence of any such condition, or where by necessary implication such condition is impossible,
then to permit parol proof to the contrary would not only vary but destroy the agreement."
Ibid., at 194, 722. This point is implied in Cannon v. Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co., 1o3 IIi.
App. 414 (1902) in which the oral agreement was offered to show that a written condition for
delivery within the contract was not operative.
z9 This function of writing is of recent origin. The early history of the magic of writing
shows a distinct distrust of everything written, which may be viewed as a consequence of
widespread illiteracy. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2426 (3d ed., r94o).
20 The law has placed some restrictions upon this method of proof by virtue of such legisla-
tion as the statute of frauds. The transfer of property interests requires a written instrument,
and parol agreements are not binding unless they have been partially executed. So the resort
to writing for this purpose is not relevant to the parol evidence rule. If there were no statute of
frauds, the parol evidence rule would not forbid the proof of many oral agreements for the
transfer of property. The clearest case wou ldbe a completely oral agreement.
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that the parties prefer to rely on the writing. It is a decision that the writing
is to be the best evidence of their agreement.2'
The recognition of this function eliminates the controversy between those
who contend that the writing is only the best evidence of the terms within it and
those who contend that it is the best evidence of the entire agreement. It is clear
that a legal obligation can be altered as significantly by changing a written term
as by adding another one. Since the only reason for executing the document
is to make certain that the obligation is determined by the writing, the writing
must be considered the best evidence of the entire agreement. Thus it should
not make a difference to the court whether a party offers to prove a prior agree-
ment to alter an existing term or add another. Because both would vary the
written obligation, neither should be admitted.22
This is the basis for the magic of the writing. Transformed into a legal con-
cept, it is the parol evidence rule which declares evidence of prior agreements in-
admissible to alter a writing that contains a complete legal obligation. The
process for the court is to determine whether the writing has sufficient terms to
describe a complete legal obligation23 If it does, the court must decide that it
represents the entire expression of the agreement. Several decisions contain an
accurate statement of the rule.24 Yet despite the variety of ways to describe
the rule, the results have been consistent with this fundamental formulation.2S
' But see Wigmore's comment that "the rule is in no sense a rule of Evidence, but a rule of
Substantive Law. It does not exclude certain data because they are for one or another reason
untrustworthy or undesirable means of evidencing some fact to be proved." 9 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 2400 (3d ed., 194o) at 3.
Since a parol agreement is promissory in nature, it can only seek to change the promissory
language of thewriting. Nothing involved in the parol evidence rule could preclude alteration of
factual statements found to be untrue. Thus, it is a common rule that receipts can be altered
by parol evidence. Starkweather v. Maginnis, 196 111. 274, 63 N.E. 692 (1902); Richardson v.
Hadsall, io6 IlL. 476 (1883); White v. Merrell, 32 Il. 511 (1863). Similarly, receipts within
contracts can be varied but not the promissory language. Hossack v. Moody, 39 Ill. App. 17
(i8go); Andrus v. Mann, 92 Ill. 40 (1879). This notion is applied to recitals of consideration.
Spence v. Central Accident Ins. Co., 236 Ill. 444, 86 N.E. 1o4 (igo8) (insurance policy);
Ludeke v. Sutherland, 87 Ill. 481 (1877) (deed). Attempts have been made to show parol
agreements by alleging them to be part of the consideration recited, which may be varied, but
the attempts have been properly rejected. Hagen v. Lehmann, 317 Ill. 227, 148 N.E. 57 (1925).
But cf. Metzger v. Emmel, 289111.52, 124 N.E. 360 (i919).
23 This is not the ordinary way in which the rule is described. See, e.g., Greene, Theories of
Interpretation in the Law of Contracts, 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 374 (i939). Yet the Illinois de-
cisions have usually adopted this language. See cases cited note 24 infra.
24 Ginsburg v. Warczak, 330 Ill. App. 89, 69 N.E. 2d 733 (1946); Armstrong Paint Works
v. Continental Can Co., 3oi Ill. 102, 133 N.E. 71i (1922); North Shore Lumber Co. v. South
Side Lumber Co., 176 Ill. App. 96 (1912); Fuchs & Lang Co. v. Kittredge & Co., 242 IlL. 88,
89 N.E. 723 (i9o9); Osgood v. Skinner, 211 Ill. 229, 71 N.E. 869 (i9o4); Telluride Power Co.
v. Crane Co., 208 Ill. 218, 70 N.E. 319 (i9o4); Union Special Sewing Machine Co. v. Lock-
wood, iio Ill. App. 387 (i9o3); Keegan v. Kinnaire, 12 Ill. App. 484 (z882).
2s A good indication of the confusion surrounding the rule is the insertion in a contract of a
provision declaring that no agreements other than those in writing have been made. If the
writing is complete, other agreements cannot be shown and if incomplete, they must be shown.
Some courts have not referred to the clause in their decisions. Lyon & Healy, Inc. v. Central
States Hotel Co., 296 Ill. App. 245, 16 N.E. 2d 155 (1938) (parol evidence admitted for an
incomplete writing); Smith v. Rust, 3io Ill. App. 47, 33 N.E. 2d 723 (194) (parol evidence in-
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The analysis of the other statements of the rule depends upon the development
of two aspects of the rule. The first is the class of agreements which biings the
rule into operation. When the rule is operative, the second aspect relates to
those agreements which are excluded by the rule.
The magic of the writing is a legal concept based upon the intention of the
parties to have their obligation determined by the writing. The implication is
that the writing must contain enough terms to constitute a complete obligation.
When it does not, parol testimony must furnish the missing terms.26 The
plaintiff in Van Kirk V. Scot 27 sought to recover for breach of an employment
contract. The only written evidence of the agreement was as fo]lows: "Will
draw at the rate of $3,750 per annum. If J. D. C. V. incapacitates himself for
business by intemperance, his salary will be stopped until he shows himself to
be fully recovered and fit for business to the satisfaction of C., P., S. & Co."128
The court found the memorandum "totally incapable of interpretation or of
enforcement" and thus found it necessary to receive parol testimony to deter-
mine the contract. 9 But the magic of writing is not always displaced because
of an incomplete writing. Whenever the missing term may be implied as a
matter of law, the writing is treated as if it were complete.3° Thus for example,
admissible for a complete contract). Others have declared it binding when the writing was
complete, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Schwarz, 31oI. App. 205, 33 N.E. 2d 934 (194i), and
not binding when the writing was incomplete, Air Conditioning Corp. v. Honaker, 296 Ill.
App. 221, i6 N.E. 2d 153 (1938).
26 A written instrument in the form of an incomplete obligation cannot perform its function.
So it is no longer possible to reason from this function in order to prohibit a party from showing
an agreement contrary to a written term. Yet an unambiguous written term may not be
altered. For a case in accord with this last proposition see Carlton v. Smith, 285 Ill. App. 38o,
2 N.E. 2d 1i6 (1936). See also Meyer v. Sharp, 341 Ill. App. 431, 435, 94 N.E. 2d 510, 512
(i95o); Offenberg v. Arrow Distilleries Co., 222 Ill. App. 512, Vx6 (i9i2); Durham v. Lathrop,
95 Ill. App. 429, 433 (i9oo); Fuchs & Lang Co. v. Kittredge & Co., 242 Ill. 88, 89 N.E. 723
(i9o9); Sabo v. Nimett, 178 111. App. 459 (1913)-
27 54 Ill. App. 681 (1894).
2SIbid., at 684.
29 Ibid., at 685. For other examples of the admissibility of parol evidence to supplement
incomplete writings, see Meyer v. Sharp, 341 Ill. App. 431, 9 4 N.E. 2d 51o (195o); Foerster v.
L. Fish Furniture Co., 265 Ill. App. 410 (1932); Durham v. Lathrop, 95 Ill. App. 429 (2900);
Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Kinneard, 35 Ill. App. io5 (I889); St. Clair County Benevolent
Society v. Fietsam, Adm'r, 97 Ill. 474 (i88i); Offenberg v. Arrow Distilleries Co., 222 Ill. App.
512 (1921); Bross v. Cairo and Vincennes R. Co., 9 Ill. App. 363 (i88i).
30 Davis v. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 208 Ill. 375, 7o N.E. 359 (i9o4); Union Special Sewing
Machine Co. v. Lockwood, iio Ill. App. 387 (I9o3). There is a second line of cases involving
an implication of law which prohibits the introduction of evidence to show a parol agreement
contrary to the implication. These cases involve a written agreement containing sufficient
terms to be complete. Having conveyed real estate by sufficient deed, and without reservation
of the crops, the grantor cannot show an oral agreement reserving the unsevered crops and
shrubbery which by law pass with the land. Damery v. Ferguson, 48 InI. App. 224 (1892);
Smith v. Price, 39 Ill. 29 (i865). A grantee cannot show an oral agreement that a portion of
the purchase price for land was to be refunded if a survey found the acreage to be less than
stated, when the contract contained a fixed price and the land was described both by its legal
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an agency contract silent only as to its duration is a complete written obliga-
tion since the tenure supplied by law is at the will of the parties. 3'
The description of the first aspect has shown that for the purpose of the parol
evidence rule's becoming operative, contracts are divided into two classes.
One is composed of writings embodying enough terms to constitute a complete
obligation. The other is composed of agreements in any other form. While the
rule operates to exclude agreements tending to alter the legal obligation in
the former but not in the latter class, it has also been shown that parol agree-
ments tending to vary written terms in incomplete writings were similarly ex-
cluded, but for another reason not yet examined.32
Yet there is nothing cosmic about the magic of the writing which prohibits
the parties from changing their minds after the document has been executed.
So there is no problem in admitting evidence to show a subsequent agreement.33
With respect to the rule's temporal limitation, the agreements which remain
to be excluded must be those made prior to the instrument. By definition, the
written terms represent the final agreement about those terms and all prior
agreements pertaining to the written terms must be excluded. The subsequent
agreement always controls. And it is for this reason that the written terms, even
those of an incomplete obligation, cannot be varied.34 There remain only prior
agreements pertaining to terms not expressed in a complete writing to be ex-
cluded because of the parol evidence rule.3s
designation and by acreage, because by law the legal designation controls. Hill v. Hatfield,
72 Ill. App. 534 (1897). But cf. Ludeke v. Sutherland, 87 Ill. 481 (1877). Since implications of
law can be negated by agreement, Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal & Coke Co.,
334 Ill. 281, x65 N.E. 793 (1929), and since parol testimony of the negation is not admissible
to alter a written obligation, the implication of law must have been treated as if it were a
written term.
3' Union Special Sewing Machine Co. v. Lockwood, 1o Ill. App. 387 (1903).
32 See discussion in note 26 supra.
33 "It is competent to show by parol a subsequent verbal change, modification or discharge
of a written contract. .. ." Redden v. Inman, 6 Ill. App. 55, 59 (i88o). Accord: Lyon & Healy,
Inc. v. Central States Hotel Co., 296 Ill. App. 245, 16 N.E. 2d i5s (1938).
34 A term may of course refer to some prior negotiation in which case the writing will be
qualified to that extent. Durham v. Gill, 48 Il. ii (1869); Gage v. Cameron, 212 Ill. 146,
72 N.E. 204 (1904).
35 It is no exception to this conclusion "that the rule only applies to unexecuted parol agree-
ments." Warder, Bushnell & Glessner Co. v. Arnold, 75 Ill. App. 674, 675 (1897). Facts similar
to the Warder case are presented in Wood v. Dillon, 329 Ill. App. z6, 66 N.E. 2d 743 (946)
and Robbins v. Conway, 92 I0I. App. 173 (i9oo), but there was no discussion of this point.
In Green v. Gawne, 382 Ill. 363, 47 N.E. 2d 86 (1943), a parol agreement executed for seven
years was treated as if it were prior and unexecuted. While an executed agreement is, at its
origin, a prior agreement, its execution occurs subsequent to the signing of the document, and
it is treated like any other new and subsequent agreement and thus becomes admissible under
the parol evidence rule. Gault v. Hunt, 183 Ill. App. 77 (1913) (semble).
Some agreements chronologically subsequent have been in issue under the parol evidence
rule which required that they be labeled as prior or contemporaneous agreements. Ryan
v. Cooke, 172 I1. 302, 50 N.E. 213 (i898); Cooney v. Murray, 45 Ill. App. 463 (1892).
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If the intended function of writing within the commercial world is to be ac-
curately reflected by the law, then upon the introduction of a complete written
obligation, the legal concept ought to make inadmissible any evidence of prior
agreements for the same transaction tending to add a term to the writing. The
statement as found in the decisions is "[ilf it imports on its face to be a complete
expression of the whole agreement,--that is, contains such language as imports
a complete legal obligation,-it is to be presumed that the parties introduced
into it every material item and term, and parol evidence cannot be admitted
to add another term to the agreement although the writing contains nothing
on this particular term to which the parol evidence is directed."36 This is not
merely the most accurate and significant way to describe the function of writ-
ing as a legal concept. It makes the results of the parol evidence decisions
consistent.
Yet, the writers have described the rule differently. Professor Sharp has said
that "[t]he court indeed first considers whether it is sensible to suppose that
such a collateral understanding in view of all the circumstances might in fact
have been made and not superseded by the writing."7 If it is sensible to sup-
pose that the parol agreement was made and not superseded by the writing
whenever the writing is an incomplete obligation, this is a restatement of the
concept previously derived. But taken in its ordinary sense, Professor Sharp's
statement is a difficult test.
36 Armstrong Paint Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, Io6, 133 N.E. 711, 713
(1922). A less articulate statement is that "prior parol agreements are inadmissible to vary,
contradict or add to the terms of a written contract." Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Brant,
17 Ill. App. 151, '53 (I885). See also Jones v. Aetna Ins. Co., 226 Ill. App. 16o (1922). A
second form is that prior parol agreements are inadmissible to impair the legal effect of a written
agreement. Smith v. Price, 39 Ill. 29 (i865). An early description of the rule was that contracts
cannot rest partly in writing and partly in parol. Lane v. Sharpe, 4 Ill. 566 (1842); O'Reer v.
Strong, 13 Ill. 688 (1852); Wear v. Parish, 26 Ill. 240 (x86i); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Webster,
69 Ill. 392 (1873); Wood v. Surrells, 89 Ill. 107 (1878); Graham v. Eiszner, 28 Ill. App. 269
(1888); Cooney v. Murray, 45 Ill. App. 463 (1892); Over v. Walzer, io3 Ill. App. 104 (1902).
During this same period, however, the decisions, in effect, repudiated this rule by admitting
parol agreements wherever an incomplete writing was found. Ludeke v. Sutherland, 87 Ill. 481
(1871); Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Kinneard, 35 Ill. App. io5 (i889); Durham v. Lathrop, 95
Ill. App. 429 (1900).
37 Sharp, Promissory Liability, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1939). Cited in support of this
formulation are Mitchell v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, i6o N.E. 646 (1928) and Danielson v. Bank
of Scandinavia, 201 Wis. 392, 23o N.W. 83 (1930). The Mitchell case involved a complete
written contract for the sale of real estate. The plaintiff sought to add an oral agreement
(based on the same consideration) to the effect that an ice house belonging to the seller and
located on another's property adjacent to the land being purchased was to be removed. The
offer of proof was inadmissible. The Danielson case involved the sale of a mortgage evidenced
by a writing that contained only a receipt of the price, the interest rate, and a promise by
the seller to keep the mortgage instrument in his vault for the buyer. To this incomplete
writing the court admitted evidence to show an oral agreement requiring the seller to refund
the purchase price if the buyer were not satisfied. Properly interpreted as precedent, these
cases support the theme of this comment as well as any cases which could be cited. See Good-
hart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 Yale L.J. 1i6 (1930). The language in
these decisions and the conclusion which was properly drawn from the language by Professor
Sharp are considered on p. 357 infra.
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None of the agreements excluded by the court require any imagination to
suppose that they could have been made. And the difficulty with inquiring
whether it is sensible to suppose the agreement was made is that, if properly de-
termined, proof of any parol agreement would not be excluded. For a court
which thinks the agreement was made has really decided that if the party were
given an opportunity, he could probably prove the agreement. The contrary is
true of a court believing that it is not plausible to suppose the agreement was
made. The process of predicting whether or not the agreement can be proved
has nothing to recommend it when the same conclusion can be accurately and
reliably reached by the adversary proceeding. So this aspect of the test simply
advocates that the parol evidence rule ought not to exist and is of no help in
explaining the decisions.
The remaining question of this test is whether it is plausible that the writing
did or did not supersede the parol understanding. If "supersede" means that
subsequent agreements control prior ones about the same term, the test would
exclude any attempt to vary a written term by parol evidence of a prior agree-
ment. But it has been shown that this result is not necessarily attributable to
the parol evidence rule. If Professor Sharp's test is to apply as the parol evi-
dence rule, it must encompass the case in which an attempt is made to add a
term to the writing. To this extent, the second aspect of the test is difficult to
apply.
If the court is to ask the parties whether they intended by the writing to
supersede the parol agreement, the party offering to show the agreement un-
doubtedly will answer negatively. The other party undoubtedly will answer
affirmatively. So this is not a very useful inquiry. The writing, which by defini-
tion does not embody the term, will not help unless the court is interested in the
completeness of the writing. But this would be to take the test in its broadest
meaning-a restatement of the rule derived from the function of writing. It can
always be urged that the court could look at the circumstances of the case. But
having looked, the court is no closer to a decision. It has not been told what
circumstances are to be controlling. Thus, if taken in any but its broadest sense,
Professor Sharp's rule is an unworkable one.
For Wigmore, the rule is "that when the parties have embodied a transaction
in a single document, the writing is indisputable as to the terms of the transac-
tion .... 1,31 In simple language, the rule is that when all the terms are in a
writing, the writing contains all the terms. Nothing can be gained by accepting
an offer to prove another term when by definition it does not exist. But in every
case the contention is that all the terms are not in the writing. A rule which
supplies the basis for deciding cases which never arise is not a very useful rule.
A cursory examination of the cases shows that the question is not whether
a party has sufficient proof, but whether the court ought to listen to the proof
at all. To make this rule applicable to this question, it was given a mystic name,
38 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2426 (3d ed., i94o) at 79.
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integration,39 and the question in those terms became whether the parties in-
tended to integrate their agreement. 40 When the parties are asked whether they
intended to embody all the terms in the writing, the one offering to prove the
agreement will answer negatively and the other will answer affirmatively. If
the alleged agreement were not in fact made, then there are no other terms of the
transaction. The affirmative answer is right and the other is meaningless. The
offer of proof will be rejected. If the alleged agreement were in fact made, then
there is another term to the transaction, and since the question is designed to
give effect to their intent, both parties by their answers will require that the
agreement be enforced. It is the intent of the one giving the affirmative answer
that all terms be embodied in the writing and thus to embody the one in ques-
tion. The other party did not intend to embody the term in the writing and
thus intended it to be operative in addition to the terms in the writing.
The ultimate determination of this question depends upon whether a party
has sufficient evidence to support his allegation. The rule cannot help the court
decide whether to hear the proof in the first instance. So if this were the rule,
the result of its application would be no result at all.
Having offered a rule which is a truism and a criterion which involves no
alternative, Wigmore offers another test. No longer interested in the actual
intent, "the chief and most satisfactory index for the judge is found in the cir-
cumstance whether or not the particular element of the alleged extrinsic negotia-
39 The "process of embodying the terms of a jural act in a single memorial may be termed
the Integration of the act.. . ." Ibid., § 2425 at 76. The integration theory has been adopted
in Air Conditioning Corp. v. Honaker, 296 Ill. App. 221, 16 N.E. 2d 153 (1938); 3 Corbin,
Contracts § 573 (ist ed., 1951) at 216. Wigmore points out that the single memorial may be
oral as well as written so that the rule would apply to oral integration. He relies entirely for
this view upon Gilbert & Co. v. McGinnis, x14 Ill. 28, 28 N.E. 382 (i885). In that case, the
terms of an oral agreement provided that the buyer advance money from time to time on a
crop contract. The buyer subsequently refused to advance money unless the seller would ex-
ecute a note. The seller refused to execute the note and informed the buyer that the crops
would not be delivered when due. The buyer offered to show a trade custom that notes were to
be given in this situation. Because a trade custom may only be shown to explain an ambiguous
term and because the court found the term to be clear, the offer were rejected. The court
said "[the rule ... is equally applicable to a verbal contract, where the terms of it are defi-
nitely fixed, as they are in the present case." Ibid., at 33, 383. It is this statement which is
quoted by Wigmore in support of his point. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2425 (3d ed., 194o) at
79 n. 5. Yet the evidence excluded was not a parol agreement. The rule in the quotation was
not the rule of integration by which the court seeks to determine whether the parties intended
to embody all the terms in a single utterance. It was conceded that there were no additional
terms and this was an attempt to vary the plain meaning of a term by a trade custom which
Wigmore declares to be outside the scope of the integration question. Ibid., § 2464 at 211.
40 "The fundamental question is as to the intent of the parties to restrict the writing to
specific elements or subjects of negotiation ... and if that intent existed, then the other
subjects ... can be established ...." 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2431 (3d ed., i94o) at 102. The
contrary and controlling notion for the courts is that "the contentions of the parties to the
contract are not the criterion which should guide the court in determining whether the written
contract is a full expression of the agreement of the parties. The court must determine this
from the writing itself." Armstrong Paint Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, io6, 133
N.E. 711, 713 (1922).
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tion is dealt with at all in the writing. ' '4' This test, for example, operates to ex-
clude a parol agreement that would require a maximum ash content for coal
when the writing specified the screening size, because the writing has dealt with
the quality of the coal.42 It operates to exclude every agreement tending to vary
a term of the writing. Yet, it has been shown that this result is not attributable
to the parol evidence rule but to the fact that subsequent agreements control
prior ones. If the parol evidence rule does anything it must exclude parol agree-
ments adding terms to the writing and this test would always admit them.
Wigmore offers a final method of ascertaining the parties' intention to inte-
grate which is similar to the subject matter test. The rule should be applied
"only after a comparison of the kind of transaction, the terms of the document,
and the circumstances of the parties."43 Yet without more, a comparison of these
elements cannot lead to a conclusion that the parties have or have not intended
to integrate their agreement. The test is an enthymeme.
Wigmore has offered nothing to explain the decisions under the parol evidence
rule. He has criticized the only legal concept which can account for the results
and which can be derived from the function of writing in the commercial world.
He has said that the "conception of a writing as wholly and intrinsically self-
determinative of the parties' intent.., is an impossible one. ' ' 44 And yet he be-
lieves that writing does more than replace witnesses as a mode of proof. The
writing for Wigmore "is the act, not merely one of the possible ways of proving
the act."4s This is to say that "[t]he writing itself is operative . ,,46 This is
the conclusion which was here reached after examining the relationship of the
delivery doctrine to the parol evidence rule. The conclusion was that the writing
had significance of its own and upon delivery was more important than the
actual obligation. This is the magic of writing which formed the principal
notion of the parol evidence rule. So Wigmore can now be seen as an advocate
of the legal concept he sought to condemn-a rule which makes evidence of
prior parol agreements inadmissible to alter a complete legal obligation in
writing.
III
The effect of writing upon the determination of contract obligations has been
analyzed with respect to the admissibility of parol agreements. It is impossible to
decide the admissibility question or to define the obligation until the written
terms have been interpreted. So the parol evidence rule involves both the selec-
tion and the interpretation of contractual terms.
419 Wigmore, Evidence § 2430 (3d ed., i94o) at 98.
42 Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal & Coke Co., 334 Ill. 281, i65 N.E. 793
(1929).
43 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2442 (3d ed., i94o) at 132.
44 Ibid., § 2431 at 1o3.
4S Ibid., § 2426 at 87. Note that Wigmore also asserted that "a writing is, of itself alone
considered, nothing,--smply nothing." Ibid., § 2400 at 5.
46 Ibid., § 2426 at 87.
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The interpretation aspect is stated as a rule which admits parol evidence to
explain ambiguous terms.47 In the sense that most words have more than one
meaning, ambiguity is always present. The result of using this definition would
be to make the parol evidence rule completely ineffective. So an ambiguous
term must be one for which the appropriate meaning is not clear.
The search for appropriate meanings is the function of the objective theory.
The appropriate meaning for this theory is the one upon which the promisee may
reasonably rely. It involves the standard of the reasonable man. The rule about
trade usage, for example, describes the framework of knowledge within which
he selects the appropriate meaning. When a term is ambiguous within its
written context, trade usage is admissible, and if the meaning is then clear, no
further parol evidence may be received.48 But if there is no usage to explain an
ambiguous term, then parol evidence is admissible.49 Where a term is clear
within its written context, usage is nevertheless admittedso unless it has been
negated by agreement appearing in the writing.51
Since usage may always be shown unless it is expressly negated, it is apparent
that commercial understandings are part of the framework for' interpreting
contracts. The rule which admits parol evidence to explain ambiguities does so
when the written context and the commercial understandings are unable to
provide meaning for which there is no likely alternative. The doctrine about
interpretation for the parol evidence rule is therefore the objective theory.
It was shown.that to the extent the parol evidence rule selects terms, the rule
is based upon a commercial understanding about the significance of writing.
The rule about trade usage has shown that commercial understandings are
included within the framework inwhich the objective theory determines contract
obligations. Consequently, the rule about trade usage has shown that it was the
objective theory which actually excluded evidence of prior parol agreements
to add a term to a complete writing.52
47 See, e.g., Armstrong Paint Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, 133 N.E. 7ii
(1922).
48 Chicago Portland Cement Co. v. Hofman, z68 Ill. App. 71 (1912); Packard v. Van
Schoick, 58 Ill. 79 (1871).
49 Air Conditioning Corp. v. Honaker, 296 Ill. App. 221, i6 N.E. 2d 153 (1938).
so Leavitt v. Kennicott, 157 11. 235, 4z N.E. 737 (1895). The court in Steidtman v. Joseph
Lay Co., 234 Ill. 84, 88, 84 N.E. 640, 642 (i9o8) stated that "[tihe testimony of witnesses is
admissible to explain not only technical words of art or science, but words or phrases having
a local meaning or a special meaning in a particular calling, trade, business or profession."
s Winnesheik Ins. Co. v. Holzgrafe, 53 Ill. 56 (1870); First Trust & Savings Bank v.
Economical Drug Co., 250 Ill. App. 112 (1928); Gilbert & Co. v. McGinnis, 114 1ll. 28, 28
N.E. 382 (1885).
See the opinion of Frank, J. in Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F. 2d 641 (C.A. 2d,
1943), rev'd 322 U.S. 709 (i944). Note, however, that some of the writers have supported the
position that objective theory requires that mutual expressed understanding about the mean-
ing of any words be given effect despite the fact that the words have a different meaning in
the writing. See, e.g., Grene, Theories of Interpretation in the Law of Contracts, 6 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 374 (i939).
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Since it is really the objective theory which selects as well as interprets the
terms of a contract when writing is involved, the place of the parol evidence rule
in the law of contracts is clear. It is a restatement of the objective theory for a
select group of cases.
CONTRACTION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
CONVENIENCE OR NECESSITY?
While events national and international do steadily press
our people into a closer union, the national courts alone
make their possibly gallant, but surely eventually futile,
attempts to restore states-rightism.
-CLAPJ, J.*
Thus did one of the nation's eminent jurists rebuke a majority of his court for
a new contraction of federal jurisdiction in favor of state courts. The national
courts do seem to be making an effort to contract their jurisdiction, if not to
"restore states-rightism." Arguably, the greatly increased scope of federal
activities may warrant such a result. -Federal dockets are overcrowded with
cases arising under federal statutes. Part of the total burden could be removed
by deferring to the state courts in specific areas. Such action might make for
greater harmony between the two systems and add to the dignity of the federal
courts.2 Congressional determination of federal jurisdiction,, however, sets a
definite limit on the extent to which federal courts may contract their jurisdic-
tion in accordance with their own views of convenience and the federal-state
relationship.
A contraction of federal jurisdiction may be desirable in certain situations
where Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins3 makes definitive rulings by federal courts
impossible. In cases where its jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizen-
ship, a federal court, under the Erie doctrine, must look to the law of the state
in which it sits for its rules of decision (except for questions involving the federal
constitution or statutes). Even when the rule of the state is unsettled, the
federal court must still, in theory at least, apply what it finds the state law to
be.4 Unlike the case of a state court's ruling on a federal question, however, a
federal court's determination of state law cannot be appealed to the state su-
preme court. An anomalous situation may arise in which a state issue is adjudi-
cated by the federal court, only to be decided differently thereafter in the state
Beiersdorf v. McGohey, 187 F. 2d 14, 17 (C.A. 2d, x9si).
2Frankfurter, Distribution of judicial Power Between the United States and State Courts,
13 CornellL.Q. 499 (I928).
3304 U.S. 64 (x938).
4 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 2o8 (1939); McClare v. Mouton, 123 F. 2d 450(C.A. xoth, 194); Federal Court's Disposition of Unsettled Questions of State Law, How a
Federal Court Determines State Law, 48 Col. L. Rev. 575 (1948); How a Federal Court De-
termines State Law, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1299 (1946).
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